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T H E MARITIMES IN THE 1930S WAS for many a grim place to live. The documents 
give a picture of an often repressive society in which governments were slow to 
try to bridge the gap between the comfortable and the desperately poor. The 
three provinces were among the last to adopt such social programmes as old age 
pensions and mothers' allowances and they were on record as opposing 
unemployment insurance. They were the meanest of all the provinces in their aid 
for the unemployed. All levels of government attempted to avoid responsibility 
for relief, sometimes at the expense of the health and lives of their citizens. The 
record abounds with examples of elderly and destitute refused assistance, deaf 
and blind cut off from their schools, seriously ill denied hospitalization, and 
moral offenders savagely punished. 
Maritime governments were unique neither in the nature of their problems 
nor in their responses to them; they shared in the broad ideological currents of 
the day. • If their attitude towards those in need seemed harsher than govern-
ments in other provinces, it was primarily because of their more limited 
economic resources and their inability to participate effectively in the federal 
government's relief programmes. The matching grant formulas in the federal 
programmes would have been fair, if all the provinces had possessed equal 
wealth. But since their resources varied dramatically, the poorer provinces had 
either to commit a much greater percentage of their funds to a given programme 
or to deny to their citizens the benefits conspicuously available elsewhere.2 In 
discouraging the expansion of relief programmes at federal-provincial confer-
ences, Maritime governments were expressing the frustration and political 
* The research for this paper was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada. The author is particularly indebted to Murray Young, Eric Sager and Robert Young for 
advice and criticism and to Carol Ferguson for research assistance in newspapers. 
1 For general perspectives on relief policy see James Struthers, No Fault of Their Own: 
Unemployment and the Welfare State 1914-41 (Toronto, 1983); J.H. Thompson with Allen 
Seager, Canada, 1922-1939: Decades of Discord (Toronto, 1985); Christopher Armstrong, The 
Politics of Federalism: Ontario's Relations with the Federal Government, 1867-1942 (Toronto, 
1981); L. M. Grayson and Michael Bliss, eds., The Wretched of Canada: Letters to R.B. Bennett 
(Toronto, 1971); Michiel Horn, ed., The Dirty Thirties: Canadians in the Great Depression 
(Toronto, 1972); and John Taylor, "Relief from Relief: The Cities' Answer to Depression 
Dependency", Journal of Canadian Studies, XIV, 1 (Spring 1979), pp. 16-23. 
2 For surveys of matching grant programmes in Canada see D. V. Smiley, Conditional Grants and 
Canadian Federalism (Toronto, 1963), pp. 1-6 and J. A. Maxwell, Federal Subsidies to Provincial 
Governments in Canada (Cambridge, 1937), part II. 
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embarrassment which the inequities of the relief structure created for them. As 
the political pressure mounted locally for greater participation in federal relief 
programmes, they became more adept in cutting their meagre share of the pie 
into smaller pieces. 
This problem was compounded by the poorer provinces* inability to alleviate 
economic disparity among the municipalities within their borders. As the 
percentage of uncollected taxes mounted and the proportion of future budgets 
committed to servicing the municipal debt increased, ratepayers' representatives 
became increasingly mean in their definition of relief need. With revenues 
dwindling and debt service charges mushrooming, provincial governments 
could only urge further restraint. Thus, residents in the poorest municipalities in 
the poorest provinces became the victims of a process which at two stages 
reduced the assistance which should have come their way. 
The statistics show just how little the Maritimes obtained from the federal 
relief programmes. Of the total of $463,667,018 which the central government 
distributed among the provinces from 1930 to 1939, residents of the Maritimes 
received only $15,151,475 or 3.3 per cent. Calculated on a per capita basis, this 
works out to just over a third or 33.5 per cent of the national average. If one 
includes federal relief loans to the provinces of $175,839,121, the Maritimes' 
share drops to less than a quarter or 23.7 per cent.3 The disparity in federal 
funding was also reflected in the smaller amount actually paid the recipients of 
direct relief. In the winter months, from January to May 1935, for example, the 
three levels of government spent an average of $2.84 for each relief recipient in 
the Maritimes, an amount less than one half of the $6.18 spent in the remaining 
six provinces.4 
The contemporary explanation for the discrepancy was the apparent difference 
in need. The Maritimes required less because they suffered less severely from the 
depression. This myth was widely accepted at the time and has persisted in the 
literature from the period. The myth was partly created by defenders of the 
region. In the late 1920s politicians, board of trade leaders, and newspapermen 
embarked upon a campaign to counter the negative image of their economy 
projected by the earlier Maritimes Rights propaganda and to attract investment 
in a period of economic expansion.5 When their tactics appeared to pay dividends 
3 Calculated from Department of Finance, "A Summary of Net Loans to Western Provinces under 
Relief Legislation by Fiscal Years" and "Dominion Relief Expenditures Since September 1930", 
13 June 1940, J.L. Ralston Papers, MG27 111, vol. 50, file "Loans to Provinces Gen. (Secret)", 
Public Archives of Canada [PAC]. 
4 The monthly rates for those receiving relief in the individual provinces were P.E.I., $1.93; N.S., 
$4.38; N.B., $1.67; P.Q., $5.40; Ont., $8.07; Man., $6.58; Sask., $3.58; Alb., $6.49; B.C., $6.96. 
Calculated from J.K. Houston, "An appreciation of Relief as Related to Economic and 
Employment Tendencies in Canada", 31 October 1936, Department of Labour Papers, RG27, 
vol. 2096, file Y 40, PAC. 
5 E.R. Forbes, The Maritime Rights Movement, 1919-1927: A Study in Canadian Regionalism 
(Montreal, 1979), p. 180. 
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in new investment in pulp and paper and in tourist facilities, Maritime leaders met 
renewed depression by increasing the urgency of their campaign. No group of 
evangelists could have more zealously proclaimed the message of imminent 
salvation or more vigorously denounced the sin of unbelief. The Halifax Herald 
greeted the new year of 1930 with a list of reasons for regional optimism and 
exhorted all Maritimers to keep their faith. The Moncton Times stated flatly that 
"business and labour conditions are better in the Maritimes than in any other part 
of the country". The Kings County Record printed an open letter from the editor 
of Maclean's Magazine congratulating the Maritime people on their new-found 
prosperity and urging them to maintain their positive approach; "1930 will be 
what sound thinking makes it". The Record itself went on to explain why local 
industries would not be "retarded by any temporary depression" and in 1931 
offered an editorial analyzing the "happy situation in which the Maritimes find 
themselves". The Ottawa Journal, the Telegraph Journal noted in the spring of 
1930, had stated that "while the rest of us have all become querulous and 
pessimistic the Maritimes have all become optimists". The Vancouver Sun 
attributed the transformation to the Duncan Report which "has changed the 
Maritimes from a section of despondency and decadence into a live section of 
optimism and growth" and hailed the regional defenders as "economic states-
men". By 1932, when the orchestrated optimism of regional leaders had begun to 
peter out, the impression remained throughout the country that the Maritimes 
was somehow better off.6 
The statistics of the period do not support the myth that the Maritimes suffered 
less from the depression than did the rest of Canada. Indeed, it was often 
contradicted in the data compiled for the Rowell-Sirois Commission. But the 
commission scholars did not confront the myth head on and at times seemed to 
encourage it. S.A. Saunders, for example, gave the decline in per capita income 
in the Maritimes in the first three years of the depression as four to five 
percentage points smaller than in Ontario and Quebec and far behind that of the 
West.7 But if one considers the actual figures instead of percentages, which were 
skewed by the region's incomplete recovery from the recession of the early 1920s, 
the Maritimes' per capita personal income of $185 in 1933 was only marginally 
above the Prairies' $181 and very substantially below the Canadian average of 
$262.8 The impact of the depression was more directly indicated by the only 
6 Halifax Herald, 3, 6, 7 January 1930; Moncton Times, 2 June 1930; Kings County Record, 3 
January 1930 and 2 January 1931; Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 14 April 1930. See also K.G. 
Jones, "Response to Regional Disparity in the Maritime Provinces, 1926-1942: A Study of 
Canadian Intergovernmental Relations", M.A. thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1980, pp. 
45-47. 
7 S.A. Saunders, The Economic History of the Maritime Provinces (Fredericton, 1984), pp. 49-51 
and Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Ottawa, 1940), p. 
150; W.A. Mackintosh, The Economic Background ofDominion- Provincial Relations (Ottawa, 
1939), pp. 70-1. 
8 Dominion Bureau of Statistics, National Accounts Income and Expenditure 1926-1956 (Ottawa, 
1958), p. 64. 
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complete employment survey of the period. The 1931 Census reported 19 per 
cent of regular wage-earners not working in the Maritimes on 1 June 1931 
compared with 16.6 per cent for Ontario, 16.9 per cent for Quebec and 18.4 per 
cent for the country as a whole. Only in the devastated West were the numbers 
higher, ranging from 19.9 per cent in Saskatchewan to 24.7 in British Columbia.9 
Of course, more Maritimers did live in rural areas (62.2 per cent compared with a 
national average of 47 per cent), where fuel and shelter tended to be cheaper. But 
the discrepancy in relief granted remains even when one compares urban 
communities of similar size. A report of relief in ten cities with populations of 
less than a 100,000, compiled by the Welfare Council of Canada in 1935, showed 
the average monthly cost per relief recipient for the three Maritime cities, 
Halifax, Saint John and Sydney, to be $3.77. The average for the other seven was 
$9.47.10 The lower cost of living can not explain the discrepancy, since in 1930 the 
Department of Labour reported that the average weekly cost of food, light, heat 
and rent in the Maritimes was just 7.4 per cent below the national average.11 Nor 
does James Struthers' theory of "less eligibility", i.e. the perceived need to keep 
relief low enough to prevent it from competing with local wages, in itself account 
for such large gaps in relief levels. New Brunswick's average wage of $3.82 per 
person per day was 30 per cent below the national average of $5.47, but Nova 
Scotia's $5.62 was marginally above it.12 If total relief costs in the Maritimes 
were reduced by lower wages and cheaper living expenses, they were also raised 
by the inclusion of destitute elderly and single mothers, who in Ontario and the 
West were treated separately under old age pension and mothers' allowances 
programmes.13 
9 The other provincial figures were Man., 21.4 and Alb., 21.6. Calculated from Canada Year Book 
1933 (Ottawa, 1933), p. 778. 
10 The other cities ranged from a high of $ 11.47 in Calgary to a low outside the Maritimes of $5.78 in 
Hull. Calculated from "Relief Trend Report No. 2", Papers of the Canadian Council on Social 
Development (before 1935 this was the Canadian Council on Child and Family Welfare), MG28, 
110, vol. 125, file 1935-37, PAC. The Halifax entry was compiled from "The Direct Relief 
Report...Nova Scotia", January 1935, RG27, vol. 2096, file Y 40-0 "Nova Scotia Statistics", 
PAC. This is not to suggest that amounts paid elsewhere for relief were excessive. Indeed, studies 
of relief in Ottawa and Montreal argue the contrary. See Judith Roberts-Moore, "Maximum 
Relief for Minimum Costs: Coping With Unemployment and Relief in Ottawa During the 
Depression, 1929-1939", M.A. thesis, University of Ottawa, 1980; June MacPherson, "'Brother 
Can You Spare a Dime?', The Administration of Unemployment Relief in the City of Montreal, 
1931-1941", M.A. thesis, Concordia University, 1976. 
11 The Maritime figure was $19.68 (P.E.I., $19.74; N.B., $19.87; N.S., $19.74) and the Canadian 
average $21.25. Calculated from Department of Labour, Prices in Canada and Other Countries 
7950 (Ottawa 1931), p. 7. 
12 Department of Labour, Wages and Hours of Labour in Canada 1929, 1934, and 1935 (Ottawa 
1936), p. 93; Struthers, No fault of their Own, pp. 6-7. 
13 Kenneth Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy Making in Canada (Montreal, 1974), p. 98 and 
Veronica Strong-Boag, "'Wages for Housework': Mothers' Allowances and the Beginning of 
Social Security in Canada", Journal of Canadian Studies, XIV, 1 (Spring 1979), pp. 24-33. 
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The striking disparity between the Maritimes and the other regions is 
explained in large part by the inability of the Maritimes to participate in the 
federal matching grants on which the relief programmes were based. The process 
of metropolitan consolidation which led to the concentration of manufacturing, 
wholesaling and financial institutions in southern Ontario and Quebec also 
hived much of the taxable resources of the nation within the two central 
provinces.14 Ontario and Quebec were the only provinces readily able to match 
large federal grants for relief. The western provinces were in a weaker position — 
their need greater, their finances impaired by the depression and their credit 
limited by past borrowing and reputations for less than financial orthodoxy. But 
what the westerners did retain was the confidence that however severe the 
existing depression, their ultimate growth was assured. They also believed that, 
with their increased population and political influence, they would eventually be 
able to redress injustices in the federal system which discriminated against them. 
Their problem was to obtain the money to deal with immediate relief needs. This 
they initially did by borrowing their share of the funds from the federal 
government in the form of relief loans and, as this source threatened to dry up, 
by developing a variety of expedients to extort more.15 The Maritimes, though 
no poorer in circumstances, were much poorer in future prospects. Without the 
West's option of borrowing against the expectations of future growth, they 
could only marginally participate in the shared cost relief programmes. 
The inverse relationship between poverty or need and the participation in 
federal relief was also apparent within the Maritime region. New Brunswick's 
greater problems were reflected in a per capita income figure of $174 and an 
unemployment rate of 20 per cent compared with Nova Scotia's $202 and 19.6 
per cent. Yet Nova Scotia received 15 per cent more on a per capita basis for 
relief purposes and an additional $3.2 million for their destitute elderly before 
New Brunswick joined the old age pension programme.16 The gap appears more 
severe in the amounts actually given relief recipients. In 1934, for example, 
recipients in New Brunswick received an average of $2.27 per month compared 
14 See L.D. McCann, "Metropolitanism and Branch Businesses in the Maritimes, 1881-1931", 
Acadiensis, XIII, 1 (Autumn 1983), pp. 112-25 and T.W. Acheson, "The Maritimes and 'Empire 
Canada'" in D. Bercuson, Canada and the Burden of Unity (Toronto, 1977), pp. 87-114. 
15 As Minister of Finance Rhodes' correspondence with the western governments on relief was 
voluminous. See especially Memoranda dated 30 May and 13 July 1932, Rhodes Papers, MG2, 
pp. 47947 and 47134, Public Archives of Nova Scotia [PANS]. For British Columbian and 
Saskatchewan perspectives on relief administration see J.D. Belshaw, "The Administration of 
Relief to the Unemployed in Vancouver during the Great Depression", M.A. thesis, Simon 
Fraser University, 1982; Blair Neatby, "The Saskatchewan Relief Commission, 1931-34" in 
Donald Swainson, ed., Historical Essays on the Prairie Provinces (Toronto, 1970); P.H. 
Brennan, "Public Relief Works in Saskatchewan Cities, 1929-1940", M.A. thesis, University of 
Regina, 1981; Alma Lawton, "Urban Relief in Saskatchewan during the Years of the Depression, 
1930-1939", M.A. thesis, University of Saskatchewan (Saskatoon), 1969. 
16 See footnotes 3 and 9 above and W. Eggleston and C.T. Kraft, Dominion-Provincial Subsidies 
and Grants (Ottawa, 1939), pp. 104 and 115. 
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with $3.72 for those in Nova Scotia or 39 per cent less, while Prince Edward 
Island whose per capita income was just $133 paid out an average of only $2.21 
per recipient.17 
The onset of the depression found the three Maritime governments already 
struggling with problems arising from the matching grants formula. The old age 
pension scheme by which the federal government paid half the cost of $20 
monthly pensions to the needy elderly posed a serious problem for Maritime 
governments. Already burdened with debt charges as a percentage of revenue far 
above the national average (26 per cent for Nova Scotia and 28 per cent for New 
Brunswick compared with 15 per cent for all provinces), they could ill afford a 
programme which might consume an additional 15 to 20 per cent of annual 
revenues.18 Limited finances along with a disproportionate number of poten-
tially eligible aged seemed to put the pension scheme out of reach. Yet the 
pressure on the governments to establish pensions mounted as national funds 
were directed to the elderly in Ontario and the four western provinces while 
denied to those in the Maritimes. The failure to provide old age pensions was a 
factor in the discontent which almost defeated the Conservative government of 
E.N. Rhodes in the Nova Scotia election of 1928.19 In the late 1920s elderly 
Maritimers sent their often pathetic letters to federal politicians requesting 
assistance from the national pension scheme, but the latter disclaimed any 
responsibility and referred them to provincial governments. In the federal 
election of 1930 Mackenzie King claimed that pensions were a provincial 
responsibility; the problem was constitutional. Campaigning in the Maritimes, 
R.B. Bennett gave the constitutional argument short shrift: "I will see to it that 
old age pensions are paid to every province.... it is a national obligation.... If the 
Dominion can pay fifty per cent of the Old Age Pensions why cannot it pay 99 
per cent?"20 
After the federal election, the provincial spokesmen cited Bennett's statements 
17 P.E.I.'s unemployment rate was 6.8 per cent in 1931. 
18 Royal Commission on Dominion-provincial Relations, Public Accounts Inquiry, Dominion of 
Canada...and Provincial Governments: Comparative Statistics of Public Finance (Ottawa, 
1939), p. 95; Final Report of the Commission Appointed to Consider Old Age Pensions 
[Fredericton 1930] in New Brunswick Cabinet Papers, RG.... RS29,1930, Provincial Archives of 
New Brunswick [PANB]. Prince Edward Island's debt was relatively low at 10 per cent of 
revenues, but Premier A.C. Saunders estimated that pensions for 20 per cent of those 70 years of 
age or older would require "about 18% of the total revenue". A.C. Saunders to J.L. Ballon, 7 
January 1930, Premier's Office Papers, Provincial Archives of Prince Edward Island [PAPEI]. 
H.E. Mahon in the "Interim Report of the Commission...to Consider Old Age Pensions" 
estimated the cost of the pensions in Nova Scotia at $2.2 million at a time when provincial 
revenues totaled just under $7 million. Appendix # 3 1 , Journals of the House of Assembly, 
1929. 
19 E.R. Forbes, "The Rise and Fall 1922-33 of the Conservative Party in the Provincial Politics of 
Nova Scotia", M.A. thesis, Dalhousie University, 1967, pp. 112-4 and 129-30. 
20 Yarmouth Light, 3 July 1930 (clipping in Ralston Papers, vol. 15). See also E.N. Rhodes' speech 
in Moncton in the Moncton Times, 21 July 1930. 
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as constituting a promise of a new pension scheme and urged the elderly to write 
to the federal government. As the months passed without any word on the 
pensions, individual and provincial appeals for federally-funded pensions 
became increasingly strident.21 Finally, in the summer of 1931, the long-awaited 
announcement arrived. But it brought neither a federally administered scheme 
nor 99 per cent funding for those run by the provinces. The matching grant 
formula was still intact with the federal government's contribution raised to 75 
per cent. For the Maritime provinces this change merely tantalized. Since their 
revenues were further impaired by the depression, having to find even a quarter 
of the cost seemed to leave the pensions as far out of reach as ever. 
Nonetheless, as the political pressure for old age pensions continued, the three 
provinces eventually found a way to introduce them. In 1933 Prince Edward 
Island led the way. After conversations with the federal bureaucracy, the 
Islanders decided that, if they could not raise their revenues sufficiently to 
participate in the federal programme, they could scale down the programme to 
fit their revenues. Moreover, smaller pensions would conform more closely to 
their other relief payments. The government set the maximum pension at $15 
rather than $20 and developed a means test stricter than those employed in the 
other provinces. It passed legislation making it obligatory that children provide 
for their parents. The support of children was given an arbitrary value and added 
to the theoretical total capital wealth of the individual. This "capital" was 
assumed to yield an income of 5 per cent per year and if a person's income was 
calculated to be in excess of $125, the excess was subtracted from the pension. Of 
the approximately 6000 residents of 70 years or more on the Island, only 1200 
were ruled eligible for any portion of the pension. Many of these were simply 
shifted from the direct relief rolls, for which the province paid 50 per cent or 33 
1 / 3 per cent if they lived in Charlottetown, to the pension rolls for which the 
province paid just 25 per cent.22 
It was an astute political move whose advantages were not lost on the Liberal 
oppositions in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. In the former Angus L. 
Macdonald promised old age pensions in the election of 1933 and introduced 
them soon after taking office. In New Brunswick Allison Dysart made the 
government's failure to provide old age pensions an issue in the 1935 campaign 
and established them the next year. The provincial governments were careful to 
prevent the municipalities from taking advantage of money saved from the care 
of the elderly to expand relief services. A Nova Scotia spokesman at the 
Dominion-Provincial conference of 1935 told how the new government had 
intervened at the municipal level to place its own nominees on local relief 
21 See File #13 "Old Age Pensions" in Nova Scotia Provincial Secretary-Treasurer's Papers, RG7, 
vol. 225, PANS. See J.A. Macdonald to I S . Gallant, 18 October 1930, J.A. Macdonald Papers, 
PAPEL 
22 Canadian Annual Review, 1934, p. 268. See also Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy Making in 
Canada, pp. 84-97 and 101. 
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committees and boasted that through "rigid administration" and "more 
stringent regulations" it had reduced the numbers on relief from about 50,000 to 
about 16,000.23 In New Brunswick in 1936 Premier Dysart accompanied his 
pension scheme with an attempt to curb relief at the municipal level. The 
government persuaded the municipality of Gloucester, for example, to accept a 
system of relief quotas which reduced the allowance for those on relief to just 
$.70 a month.24 
Moreover, neither province admitted that they were introducing pensions that 
paid substantially less than other provinces. In New Brunswick government 
spokesmen obscured initial complaints with a discussion of means test 
regulations. Confronted with the opposition's charge that even "almshouse 
residents" did not receive more than $15, the government suggested that the 
pensions would rise once the programme became better established.25 The 
federal report for 1936-37 listed the average monthly pension paid under the act 
as $10.58 in Prince Edward island, $13.39 in New Brunswick and $14.49 in Nova 
Scotia compared with an average of $18.24 in the other six provinces.26 
The technical education programme was another which taxed the ingenuity of 
Maritime governments to participate and created additional political problems 
for them. Nova Scotia, which had pioneered technical education in Canada, had 
concentrated its expenditures at the university level. The federal act of 1919 was 
designed to encourage technical programmes in high schools. By 1929 Nova 
Scotia and Prince Edward Island governments had failed to obtain even half of 
the federal grant allotted to them.27 New Brunswick participated more fully, 
channelling funds into vocational schools in Saint John, Woodstock and 
Sussex, only to be embarrassed by the federal government's decision to-
terminate the programme in 1929. Under intense pressure from the municipali-
ties to take over the federal share of funding, New Brunswick urged the Bennett 
government to resume its contribution.28 Although federal legislation was 
passed in 1931 to do so, it was not implemented. In 1930 H.P. Blanchard of 
Colchester County warned Premier Rhodes to consider carefully the perils of 
entering another federal programme lest the senior government "back out...and 
leave the whole 100% on the province as they did with the main highways, 
23 Minutes of the Dominion-Provincial Conference, 9 December 1935, Provincial Secretary-
Treasurer's Papers, RG7, vol. 231, file 8, PANS. 
24 "Report of the Direct Relief Committee", 31 December 1936, Minutes of the Municipal Council 
of Gloucester, RG18, RS 149, PANB. 
25 Synoptic Report of the Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick, 1937, pp. 
23-5 and 1938, p. 8. 
26 Labour Gazette, XXXVII, 5 (May 1937), p. 513. 
27 Janet Guildford, "Coping with De-industrialization: The Nova Scotia Department of Technical 
Education, 1907-1930", Acadiensis, XVI, 2 (Spring 1987), p. 79 and Maxwell, Federal Subsidies 
and Provincial Governments in Canada, p. 211. 
28 J.D. Palmer and W.K. Tibert to CD. Richards, 8 December 1931 and CD. Richards to F.M. 
Sclanders, 19 February 1932, NB Cabinet Papers, RG1, RS9, PANB. 
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technical schools etc".29 
Given these difficulties, it was not surprising that the three provinces greeted 
the federal relief programmes of the 1930s with something less than enthusiasm. 
As early as 1928 the three Maritime premiers voiced their exasperation in 
response to federal labour minister Peter Heenan's proposal for unemployment 
insurance. They simply could not, they argued, commit provincial funds to a 
new programme when they were already unable to participate in existing 
programmes. Rhodes took pains to make clear that their quarrel was not with 
unemployment insurance, since they were "sympathetic to all modern measures 
of similar character". J.B.M. Baxter of New Brunswick noted both his province's 
inability to initiate pensions and the added burden of the "probable with-
drawal... of assistance to technical education" in explaining why the proposed 
unemployment scheme was "utterly impossible" for a province "of such limited 
means".30 
The new matching grants programmes of the 1930s again promised to increase 
the strain on provincial finances, they offered no guarantee of permanency, and 
they threatened to awaken expectations among municipalities and individuals 
for a degree of provincial participation which these provinces could not afford. 
The three provincial governments therefore tried to keep their participation in 
relief programmes to a minimum. They sought to portray their role as essentially 
that of intermediaries between the municipalities, who were responsible for 
relief, and the federal government, which wished to come to their aid. Nova 
Scotia warned its local governments of the limited nature of its commitment 
which would end with the termination of federal funds.31 New Brunswick went 
further, scaling down the requests for assistance from the municipalities and 
cutting off its contribution in the summer months.32 At the Dominion-provincial 
conferences Maritime representatives spoke out against further extensions of 
relief programmes, criticized the other provinces for their extravagance and 
emphasized the primary responsibility of the municipalities for relief.33 
The three provinces found more attractive the relief proposals involving 
29 H.P. Blanchard to E.N. Rhodes, 9 April 1930, Rhodes Papers, p. 40930, PANS. 
30 Copies of the three letters, E.N. Rhodes, J.B.M. Baxter and Saunders to Peter Heenan, dated 3 
August 1928, are in Rhodes Papers, p. 47338, PANS. 
31 Circular letter from R. Gordon to the Nova Scotia municipalities, 21 April 1931, Provincial 
Secretary-Treasurer's Papers, RG7, vol. 225, file 12, PANS. 
32 C.A. Ferguson, "Responses to the Unemployment Problem in Saint John, New Brunswick, 
1929-1933", M.A. thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1984, pp. 109-13 and D.P. Lemon, 
"Public Relief Policy in Moncton: The Depression Years, 1929-1939", M.A. report, University of 
New Brunswick, 1977, pp. 15-6. 
33 See statements by A. P. Paterson, Walter Lea and Mr. Paul in the Minutes of the Dominion-
Provincial Conference, 9 December 1935, Provincial Secretary's Papers, RG7, vol. 231, file 8, 
PANS; Charlottetown Guardian, 21 March 1934, quoted in LJ. Cusack, "The Prince Edward 
Island People and the Great Depression, 1930-1935", M.A. thesis, University of New Brunswick, 
1972, p. 135. 
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highway construction — particularly the trans-Canada highway projects for 
which the senior government initially paid half of the cost. These offered 
political patronage, much-needed employment, and progress towards realizing 
the provinces' strong aspirations for a tourist industry. Indeed, they suggested 
another aspect of the provinces' dilemma. Should responsible leaders concen-
trate scarce resources on the direct relief of individuals while the provincial 
infrastructure, including roads and electrical development, fell so far behind the 
rest of the country as to impair future development? Yet, after 1932, the federal 
government abandoned its highway programmes and shifted to a policy of direct 
relief because it was less costly.34 At the nadir of the depression the provinces 
were left to complete construction largely with their own resources. They 
obtained the money for both roads and direct relief by borrowing and, by the 
end of 1933, debt charges consumed respectively 35 and 55 per cent of Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick revenues. The financial problems of New Brunswick, 
in particular, remained acute throughout the decade as its governments had 
difficulty in selling bonds and faced tough negotiations with chartered 
banks.35 
The relations between the provinces and the municipalities often paralleled 
those of the provinces and the Dominion. A few of the wealthiest municipalities 
were able to participate in the federal programmes to the extent that their 
provincial governments would let them. But the gap in economic resources 
among the municipalities left the poorest without the finances to obtain more 
than a fraction of the assistance available. Moreover, like the provinces, the 
municipalities were already embarrassed by their enforced participation in 
programmes which took little account of their straitened circumstances. 
In Nova Scotia premier Harrington noted in the spring of 1931 that the 
"financial condition" of some of the municipalities seemed to be "in very bad 
shape".36 Guysborough county, already suffering from rural ; depopulation, 
general out-migration and pockets of chronic poverty in the 1920s had no 
reserves with which to cushion the effects of a new depression on its fishing and 
lumbering industries. Failing to collect more than 36 per cent of its taxes by the 
spring of 1931, the municipality found itself unable to pay bank overdrafts and 
debts to the province. A bitter county clerk protested that the escalation of costs 
in municipal estimates was due almost exclusively to the items of the budget over 
which the municipality had no control, including education, care for the insane 
34 E.N. Rhodes to J.F. Fraser, 10 November 1931, Provincial Secretary-Treasurer's Papers, vol. 225, 
#5, PANS. 
35 R.W. Gouinlock to P.S. Fielding, 21 May 1937, Premier's Office Papers, PAPEL See copy of 
telegram for the Premier of New Brunswick from "the four banks who lend money to that 
province" in G.T. Towers to J.L. Ralston, 15 April 1940, Department of Finance Papers, RG19, 
vol. 2697, PAC. 
36 G.S. Harrington to John Doull, 17 July 1931, Provincial Secretary-Treasurer's Papers, RG7, vol. 
225, PANS. 
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and the indigent ill, and child welfare. The Hospital Act, in particular, forced the 
municipality to "pay for every seeming affliction anybody may imagine he 
has".37 Faced with reports of widespread destitution, the county council sought 
permission to distribute whatever money it did obtain, in the cheapest way, as 
direct relief. 
In New Brunswick the difficulties of the poorest municipalities followed a 
similar pattern. The northern counties suffered from the problems of the forest 
industries, especially lumber, and the fisheries. With the closure of sawmills the 
parish officers of Northumberland county rapidly exceeded the amounts 
assessed their parishes for assistance to the poor. Their appeals for provincial 
help brought reminders that the parishes were a municipal responsibility and 
legislation authorizing the municipalities to borrow to meet parish obligations.38 
The Northumberland Council secured loans to cover their overseers'deficits but 
carefully assigned responsibility for both principal and interest to the parishes 
which had incurred them. Early in 1933 the provincial and federal governments 
recognized the special nature of Northumberland's difficulties by increasing 
their share of relief in the county to 80 per cent. Even this assistance was not 
sufficient to keep the county solvent. With an estimated one third of the county 
requiring relief and tax revenues shrunk to 40 per cent of "normal", the bank cut 
off credit.39 The province then provided guarantees for temporary relief loans 
until the county's new bond issue. But only a portion of the bonds could be sold 
and by 1934 the long-suffering merchants who were unable to collect the more 
than $10,000 owing for past relief orders refused further credit.40 The county's 
appeal to their famous native son, R.B. Bennett, reporting "large numbers 
destitute to danger of starvation" brought the standard reply that there was "no 
contact between Dominion and municipalities". Faced with predictions of 
"serious disorders imminent", the province finally agreed to make loans to the 
municipality while accepting its bonds as security.41 The neighbouring counties 
of Gloucester and Restigouche were likewise refused bank loans in 1934. 
Gloucester too had to be bailed out by the province but Restigouche, with a 
stronger economy, launched a collection drive, resolutely cut back on expendi-
tures and managed to re-establish its credit with the bank.42 
The New Brunswick municipalities protested what their Union spokesman 
37 J. A. Fulton to John Doull, 2 April 1931, ibid. 
38 22 George V, 1932, c.6. 
39 Minutes of the Municipal Council of Northumberland, 17, 21 January 1933, RG 18, RS153, 
PANB. 
40 Ibid., 13 February 1933. 
41 Minutes of the Municipal Council of Northumberland, 17,18 January 1934; Order in Council, 3 
April 1934, New Brunswick Cabinet Papers, PANB. 
42 Minutes of the Finance Committee of the Municipality of Gloucester, 4 April 1935, Gloucester 
County Minutes, PANB; Minutes of the Municipality of Restigouche County, 22 May 1934, 
RG18, RS155, Al, PANB and "Auditor's Report" in ibid., 1 January 1936. 
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T. H. Whalen called the province's "continually unloading things on the 
municipalities". They particularly resented the charges for hospitalization which 
the province increased during 1931.43 With so many of their people unable to pay 
for their health services, the three northern counties appealed to the province to 
assume the responsibility and became increasingly reluctant to commit the 
indigent to long term hospitalization.44 The denial of hospital services, 
particularly to the victims of tuberculosis, may have been reflected in changes in 
the provincial death rate. The number of deaths per 100,000 declined through-
out the 1920s, leveled out in the early 1930s, and rose again in Gloucester and 
Northumberland at mid-decade. In the year ending October 1935, deaths from 
tuberculosis in Gloucester municipality jumped from a previous annual average 
of less than three to 40 and the following year to 50.45 In presenting 
Northumberland's submission before the Rowell-Sirois Commission D.K. 
Hazen stated that "the Municipality, owing to lack of funds is unwilling to pay 
the expenses of hospital treatment if it can be avoided and the treatment, 
therefore, is not generally given in the advanced stages when it is most 
effective".46 In 1937 a Red Cross worker from Chatham included in her report to 
the cabinet a snapshot of a tubercular woman convalescing in a room which had 
been hastily created for her by neighbours closing in a verandah.47 A proposal to 
give health officers the authority to commit indigent patients to hospitals was 
successfully resisted by the municipalities who required formal approval of 
admissions by parish representatives. Restigouche also refused to accept 
doctors' bills not signed by the overseers of the poor.48 
The position of the parish officers directly responsible for relief was not an 
enviable one. For a consideration of perhaps $10 a year the poormasters were 
expected to investigate the needs of hundreds or even thousands of relief 
recipients and take the steps necessary for their survival. During their financial 
crises, the municipal councils tended to divide whatever money they collected 
among their most pressing creditors and to distribute what was left among the 
parishes for relief. When the money ran out, the poormasters often tried to 
secure loans on their personal credit for which the municipality might eventually 
43 Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Report of Proceedings, 23 May 1938, p. 
9069. (Copy in stacks at Harriet Irving Library, UNB.) 
44 Minutes of the Municipal Council of Gloucester, 20 January 1932; Minutes of the Municipality 
of Restigouche County, 18 January 1934, PANB. 
45 The Annual Reports of the Sub-Health District of Gloucester were included with the county 
minutes, 31 October 1935 and 31 October 1936. For expenditures on tuberculosis care see 
Submission by The Municipality of Gloucester to the Royal Commission on Dominion-
Provincial Relations (April, 1938), p. 15. (Copy in stacks at Harriet Irving Library.) 
46 Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Report of Proceedings, May 23,1938, p. 
9085. 
47 Mrs. E.T. McLean to J.B. McNair, 17 January 1938, New Brunswick Cabinet Papers, PANB. 
48 Minutes of the Municipality of Restigouche, 18 January 1935 and 22 January and 17 July 1936 
and Minutes of the Municipality of Gloucester, 24 January 1936. 
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take responsibility. On one hand was the constraint imposed by the difficulty of 
borrowing money and, on the other, the pressure of watching their friends and 
neighbours go hungry. An investigation of Restigouche finances in 1934 revealed 
several thousands of dollars in unrecorded liabilities incurred by individual 
poormasters.49 It is not surprising that the harried poormasters reacted angrily 
towards those who inadvertently increased the number of mouths they had to 
feed. Sentences of nine months to a year became customary for males prosecuted 
by the poormasters for the crime of bastardy.50 
The problems of Prince Edward Island were similar to those of the rural 
municipalities. In the 1920s, the province faced rising expectations in education, 
roads, health and welfare with hopelessly inelastic revenues and a longstanding 
tradition of popular resistance to direct taxation. Of greatest urgency was the 
need to provide better public health services. National anti-tuberculosis cam-
paigns had considerable appeal when upwards of one per cent of the population 
(estimates ranged from 700 to 1000) were infected by the disease.51 Pressure from 
Women's Institutes, Red Cross and other groups for the construction of a 
sanitarium drove Premier A.C. Saunders to desperate pleas for additional funds 
from the federal government. As he told the Young Men's Commercial Club in 
1928, in resisting their petition for a sanitarium, there are "only two sources of 
revenue", the federal government and the farmers, and the latter "do not feel 
disposed to stand for any additional taxes".52 Specifically Saunders called on the 
federal politicians for the province's share of additional funds which might come 
from the general rationalization of provincial subsidies recommended by the 
Duncan Commission. The King government had used a vague promise of a new 
investigation to detach Prince Edward Island from the Maritime Rights 
campaign, but the anticipated settlement failed to materialize. At the beginning 
of the 1930s A.C. Saunders and his successor, W.M. Lea, diverted appeals for 
improved services, including higher salaries for teachers and old age pensions, 
with the plea that these must await the additional funds from Ottawa.53 The 
province did contribute $30,000 to the building of a small sanitarium by 
volunteer groups, but it obtained a portion of this money by cutting back the 
assistance previously given to enable blind and deaf children to study in the 
specialized schools in Halifax.54 
49 "Auditor's Report", Minutes of the Municipality of Restigouche, 3 July 1934. 
50 J.W. Farth to J.B. McNair, 20 August 1935 and A.W. Bennett to A.J. Leger, 13 March 1931, New 
Brunswick Cabinet Papers, PANB. 
51 A.C. Saunders to Rev. T. Constable, 26 November 1928, Premier's Office Papers, PAPEL 
52 A.C. Saunders to G.S. Buntain, 1 March 1928, ibid. 
53 E.R. Forbes, The Maritime Rights Movement, pp. 186-7; A.C. Saunders to Agnes Murnaghan, 
27 March 1929, and W. Lea to R.B. Bennett, 5 February 1931, Premiers' Office Papers, 
PAPEL 
54 A.C. Saunders to G.E. Saville, 31 October 1939; G.E. Saville to A.C. Saunders, 28 October 1929, 
and A.C. Saunders to George Bateman, 29 August 1929, ibid.. 
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With the onslaught of another depression, successive P.E.I, premiers worked 
to minimize the popular expectation of relief. Relief, they argued, was largely 
unnecessary for the Island with an economy based on mixed farming and lacking 
either the large population of industrial unemployed or the drought which 
afflicted the West. But as the bottom dropped out of the market for Island 
potatoes and fish these arguments became less convincing.55 Lacking rural 
municipalities, the provincial government was responsible for relief outside of 
the towns, and in a deliberate policy to discourage those seeking relief, it refused 
to inaugurate new procedures. It merely extended the traditional paupers' list by 
which indigents were aided at the rate of $5 per family per month after a case had 
been made for them by local clergymen, doctors or neighbours. It also 
encouraged volunteer agencies to greater efforts in succoring those in difficulty. 
In 1932 it did persuade the federal government to pay for a portion of the 
paupers' list and the customary third for relief administered through the 
municipality of Charlottetown.56 
The letters to the premiers documenting individual cases for relief reveal 
unpleasant features of rural poverty. They tell of farmers lacking seed for crops, 
of animals slowly starving in their stalls, of children suffering malnutrition, and 
of a long waiting list for the sanitarium.57 Moreover, as the depression worsened, 
its impact became cumulative and apparently irrevocable. In a 1936 letter to the 
Dominion commissioner of relief, Prince Edward Island's Deputy Provincial 
Treasurer, P.S. Fielding, explained that unemployment conditions on the Island 
had failed to respond to improved markets because "a large proportion of our 
farming population has...degenerated into circumstances where the conditions 
of market have very little effect on their general living conditions. They...have 
reached the stage where they are unable to cultivate their land, which has 
consequently...deteriorated. Stock and equipment have been gradually de-
pleted...during the past winter conditions generally were far more critical 
than...in any previous season". Two years later an unemployment committee 
representing churches, labour unions, the Legion, the Free Dispensary and the 
Fishermen's Loan Board reported "distress and destitution" in Charlottetown 
and "employment conditions...more serious than at any time since the 
depression set in".58 
The direct relief statistics from municipalities reinforce the impression of an 
inverse correlation between poverty and relief under the matching grants 
55 Cusack, "Prince Edward Island and the Great Depression", ch. 2. 
56 J.D. Stewart to Harry Hereford, 9 January 1934, "Direct Relief Files 1935-1941", Records of 
Dominion-Provincial Affairs, RG21, PAPEL 
57 P.A. Scully to A.C. Saunders, 27 September 1929, and Dr. R.K. Boswell to T. Campbell, 6 
February 1939, Premier's Office Papers, PAPEL "I know you may be tired of such cases", 
Boswell wrote. 
58 P.S. Fielding to Harry Hereford, 6 August 1936, "Direct Relief Files 1935-1941", PAPEI; see 
resolution and collection of statements dated 11 May 1938 in ibid.. 
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programme. In Nova Scotia one can discern four levels of assistance according 
to the average monthly payments to relief recipients. The most generous 
community, Amherst, which before the war boasted more millionaires per capita 
than any other town or city in Canada, occupies a level by itself.59 This small 
manufacturing and commercial centre of about 8,000 maintained almost 2000 
people on relief throughout 1933 at an average cost of $5.70 per month.60 This 
figure was almost on a par with the national average and more than a quarter 
above the per recipient contribution of any other Maritime municipality. At a 
relief conference of Nova Scotian municipalities in 1934, Amherst Mayor Read 
defended his town's greater largesse by noting that its grant for food worked out 
to 4 1/2 cents per person per meal for a family of four and invited the other 
mayors to explain "how anyone can live on less". His challenge was not 
accepted. Amherst retained and even extended its lead through the remainder of 
the decade.61 
Mining towns held three out of four places at the next level. Glace Bay, 
Springhill, and New Waterford owed their prominence in granting relief less to 
relative wealth than to the organization and political influence of those 
demanding assistance. The initial pressure for help came from areas where 
labour was organized, alert to the funds distributed in industrial centres 
elsewhere, and determined to obtain their share. Familiar with the co-operative 
relief activities required by strikes, the leaders of District #26 United Mine 
Workers of America co-operated with the Corporation in rationing shifts and 
with the municipalities in appointing investigating committees to apply for and 
distribute what direct relief was available. The town of Glace Bay borrowed 
$100,000 in 1930-31 and then, with its credit nearly exhausted, required 
"donations" to the municipality from relief recipients of one-third of their total 
assistance as an expedient to keep federal and provincial funds flowing.62 
Although required to abandon this practice, the miners were able to force 
attention from Conservative provincial and federal governments who regarded 
the industrial centres as critical to their continued political success.63 Particu-
59 Nolan Reilly, "The Growth and Decline of Amherst as a Manufacturing Centre, 1860-1930", a 
paper delivered to the Sixth Atlantic Studies Conference, May 1985. 
60 The monthly "Direct Relief Reports" from Nova Scotia to the Minister of Labour are complete 
from April 1933 to March 1934 and largely complete from October 1932 until the end of the 
decade, RG27, vol. 2096, file Y 40-0, PAC. 
61 Proceedings of...the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, 1934, p. 143. For accounts of what it 
was like to "live on less" see David Frank and Don MacGillivray, eds., George MacEachern: An 
Autobiography (Sydney, 1987), ch. 3. 
62 M.S. Campbell, "Re unemployment situation etc. Sydney, North Sydney, Sydney Mines, New 
Waterford, Dominion, Glace Bay, Louisburg and Springhill", copy enclosed with H.H. Ward to 
G.S. Harrington, 18 August 1931, Provincial Secretary-Treasurer's Papers, RG7, vol. 226, #7, 
PAC. 
63 W.J. White, "Left wing Politics and Community: A Study of Glace Bay, 1930-1940", M.A. thesis, 
Dalhousie University, 1978, pp. 69-77 and 44-7". 
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larly useful at this time was their reputation for radical militancy. A federal 
investigator of conditions in the mining communities in August 1931 reported 
that "the Red element" was "showing signs of liveliness" and there was potential 
for a strike "worse than anything previous in the history of Cape Breton". This 
report was followed by the announcement of new relief projects by the senior 
levels of government. The federal government also increased coal and steel 
tariffs and coal transportation subsidies.64 
Most other urban centres, Halifax, Trenton, Westville, New Glasgow, Sydney 
Mines, Truro, Dartmouth, Sydney, and North Sydney, gave relief averaging in 
the $3.50 to $3.00 range. Last among the towns which paid relief on a twelve 
month basis were Inverness, Pictou, and Stellarton at close to $2.00 each. Only 
two rural municipalities paid relief for the twelve month period, Pictou County 
at $3.07 and Cape Breton County at $2.07. At the bottom level were the 
remaining 17 municipalities who paid relief on an irregular basis often restricted 
to the winter period. Guysborough County was one of these. In 1934 it cut off 
relief in May and did not resume it again until February. A check of 
Guysborough's relief payments in the peak month of March indicate how erratic 
and limited its assistance really was, even during the few months it was offered. 
In 1934 the three levels of government distributed through the municipality 
$3066 to 2696 people for an average of $ 1.14 per person. A year later they gave 90 
people an average of $2.20 apiece for the month. 
On Prince Edward Island the gap was sharp between those receiving 
provincial aid and those assisted through the municipality of Charlottetown. 
For February 1935 the average payment for the 6466 provincial recipients was 
$1.90 compared to Charlottetown's $3.20 for 2119 residents of the city. For 
February 1936 the disparity increased as the respective averages were $2.19 and 
$5.35. Prince Edward Island's overall figures were reduced by interruptions in 
relief, usually during the summer months. The combined average of province 
and city for the year 1935 was just $1.77.65 
For New Brunswick more fragmentary data suggests a similar gulf between the 
stronger and weaker municipalities in the amount paid. In the year ending 31 
March 1935, Moncton carried an average 1344 people at a monthly rate of $3.35, 
Saint John paid $2.93 to a monthly average of 4761, and Campbellton assisted 
507 people at $1.35 a month for two months.66 In February 1936, Gloucester 
municipality gave its 12,234 relief recipients an average of $1.14 apiece. 
February averages for the previous year for Moncton and Saint John were 
64 M.S. Campbell, "Re. unemployment situation etc.", op.çit. 
65 Copies of monthly relief reports to the Minister of Labour are contained in two boxes of papers 
entitled "Relief to 1940", PAPEI and in RG27, vol. 2096 Y 40-1, "Statistics PEI" (First and 
Second sections), PAC. 
66 New Brunswick seemed determined to avoid supplying data which could be used for 
comparisons in the amounts of relief given. Statistics on three communities for one year is given 
in Department of Labour Papers, RG27, vol. 2096, file Y40, "Classification of Unemployed", 
PAC. 
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respectively $4.35 and $3.21. In Ontario the average paid each relief recipient for 
the same month was $8.13.67 
In New Brunswick the low level of relief given even prevented the province's 
participation in the national programme for encouraging a return to the land. 
The talk of a "back-to-the- land" movement initially drew responsive echoes 
from New Brunswick, whose politicians were conscious of its large tracts of 
uncleared forests, previous failures to attract immigrants, and an earlier interest 
in colonization by Acadian spokesmen. In 1930 premier J.B.M. Baxter advised 
the unemployed to "go back to the land and work it", for as long as one has "land 
and health" a man will not starve.68 The province announced a new tripartite 
programme to go into effect in March 1932, appointed a board to administer it, 
and began surveying lands and building roads for the new settlers.69 But the New 
Brunswick government apparently failed to consider the terms of the national 
programme from the prospective of its municipalities. The programme called 
for each level of government to contribute $200 per family: $400 for building 
materials, animals and farm implements and the remaining $200 to provide 
additional support over the first two years. In Ontario, at these figures, 
municipalities might expect to recover their investment in the first two years 
through a saving of direct relief costs. In Nova Scotia, where the programme was 
inaugurated for "surplus" miners, it at least suggested the possibility of an 
eventual break even point.70 But so much lower were the direct relief totals in 
New Brunswick that the programme meant only increased costs to the 
municipalities. Some municipalities were also uneasy about who would be 
responsible for future relief in the new settlements should they fail to become 
self-sustaining. New Brunswick municipalities therefore unanimously rejected 
the scheme. Even Restigouche County, which had rushed to offer Campbellton 
as a headquarters for the programme, ultimately refused to participate.71 
It is one of the ironies of the period that the back-to-the-land movement 
became most popular in a province which could not participate in the national 
programme. So desperate were many New Brunswickers and so limited their 
alternatives that they clambered to take out land with only a fraction of the 
67 Report of the Direct Relief Committee to the Municipal Council of Gloucester in Minutes, 31 
December 1936, p. 452. PANB, RG18, RS 149 gives the amount spent on relief for the month. The 
numbers on relief in New Brunswick municipalities for one month only are contained in Papers 
of the Department of Public Works, RG14, RS128,4/16, PANB. For provincial figures see J.K. 
Houston, "An Appreciation of Relief", p. 25. 
68 Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 15 September 1930 and New Brunswick, Report of the 
Department of Lands and Mines, 1930, pp. 53-4. 
69 "Agreement...", 17 May 1932, New Brunswick Cabinet Papers, PANB; Report of the 
Department of Lands and Mines, 1932, p. 56. 
70 Department of Labour, "Report on Nova Scotia's Unemployed", R.B. Bennett Papers, p. 
477764, Harriet Irving Library, UNB. 
71 Moncton Transcript, 17 June 1932: Minutes of the Council of the Municipality of Restigouche, 
23 January 1931 and 5 July 1932. 
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assistance available elsewhere. In 1932 the number of new families setting out 
each year to carve new farms out of the New Brunswick wilderness rose from 
about 150 to more than 300 and after 1936 exceeded 600. By 1939 the department 
of lands and mines, which was responsible for parcelling out the lands, reported 
a population of 11,165 in several dozens of new settlements concentrated in the 
northern counties. Quebec with five times the population had 24,666 and 
Manitoba came a distant third at 5900.72 
Despite their heroic efforts in clearing and cultivating land, few of the new 
settlers managed to become economically independent. The provincial govern-
ment regularly supplied them with seed, allowed pulp-cutting from their 100 
acre claims and, aided by federal grants for the relief of unorganized territories, 
supplied $4.07 worth of groceries four times a year.73 In 1935 the province 
circulated additional cash among the colonists through bonuses for land 
ploughed and brought under cultivation. In the summer of 1939 a federal 
department of agriculture analysis of the economic progress of 300 settlers in 
northern New Brunswick revealed that their average total net worth including 
cleared land, buildings, farm implements, and personal possessions after an 
average of 4.2 years on their new holdings amounted to just $578. This was about 
what they might have received at the outset had they resided in most other 
provinces. Noting their lack of adequate farm implements, machinery for 
clearing land and sewing machines for their wives, the investigators concluded 
that, as a result of insufficient capital, their efforts had been largely wasted.74 
In August 1934 the federal government officially abandoned the matching 
grants formula in direct relief for a new programme of grants-in-aid to the 
provinces. These were to be based on "need and the ability of the province to deal 
with the problem". The grants, which were fixed in advance and paid regularly at 
monthly intervals, did help the provinces in planning their programmes. They 
had limited effect, however, on the distribution of federal assistance since the 
principal indicator of need was taken to be the money spent by each province 
under the old matching grants system. The timing of the transition was 
unfortunate for the Maritimes. The new monthly relief grants of $68,000 — 
$2,125 to Prince Edward Island, $25,000 to New Brunswick and $40,875 to Nova 
Scotia — were substantially less than the federal share of relief costs paid to the 
72 New Brunswick, Report of Department of Lands and Mines, 1939, p. 120; Department of 
Labour, "Dominion Unemployment Relief Since 1930" (January 1940), p. 39; see also W.M. 
Jones, "Relief Land Settlement" in L. Richter, ed., Canada's Unemployment Problem (Toronto 
1939), pp. 261-95. 
73 E.M. Poirier, "The Founding of Allardville Settlement", M.A. report, University of New 
Brunswick, 1973, p. 21. 
74 A. Gosselin and G.R Boucher, Settlement Problems in Northern New Brunswick (Ottawa, 1944), 
Canada Department of Agriculture Publication No. 764, pp. 24-9. By this time the provincial 
department responsible was also beginning to doubt the value of the programme. See 
Department of Lands and Mines, "A Discussion of Land Settlement in New Brunswick", RG10, 
RS 106, box 42, "Correspondence re Reconstruction". 
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region for 1933. But unlike the country as a whole, whose relief payments 
continued to rise during the first half of 1934, those in the Maritimes declined 
sharply as municipalities ran out of money and provincial governments forced 
draconian cutbacks in the summer months. In 1933 monthly relief totals varied 
from $312,422 in February to $164,253 in July. In 1934 the totals were 
respectively $268,700 and $101,810 for the same two months.75 Thus, while the 
new grants-in-aid could be projected as increases over the low summer relief 
totals,76 they were in fact reductions of more than 1/4 from the average monthly 
direct relief payments by the federal government to the Maritimes through the 
calendar year of 1933. The federal payments continued with little variation 
through 1935 and in December ofthat year provided the base for a 75 per cent 
increase to all provinces by a newly elected Liberal government. The increase 
was intended "to enable the provinces to lighten the burden upon the 
municipalities".77 
The matching grants mentality persisted, however. In 1936 the King 
government commissioned Charlotte Whitton of the Canadian Welfare Council 
to analyze the existing relief structure and to produce recommendations for 
reform. Whitton, who emphasized the importance of professional social 
workers in the distribution of relief and was adept at telling King what he wished 
to hear, counselled against any additional assumption of relief responsibilities by 
the federal government.78 The need for expert supervision was implicit in her 
charge that, under the grants-in-aid system, the provinces were escaping their 
relief responsibilities. Whitton chose the Maritime provinces as her prime 
exhibit of provincial delinquency. In nearly half a page of underlined prose, she 
reviewed past relief statistics on the Maritimes to suggest prosperity (later she 
referred directly to "prosperous and pleasant little Prince Edward Island") and 
gave the startling information that the provincial and municipal governments 
were together paying only 19 per cent of relief costs on the Island, 12 per cent in 
Nova Scotia, and eight per cent in New Brunswick. Whitton created her 
dramatic statistics by reference to a period which did not include the winter 
months in which most Maritime municipalities concentrated their limited 
payments. Elsewhere her own tables reveal the anomaly that she was presenting. 
For the year, 1935-36, they show that New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince 
Edward Island paid respectively 56 per cent, 39 per cent and 68 per cent of their 
direct relief costs. The provinces may not have been aware of the attack which 
had been launched against them. Whitton asked that her 300 page study be kept 
75 Department of Labour, "Dominion Unemployment Relief Since 1930" (January 1940), pp. 97-8, 
Department of Labour Papers, RG27, vol. 213, PAC and J.K. Houston, "An Appreciation of 
Relief, pp. 21-3. 
76 See James Struthers, No Fault of Their Own, p. 117 and p. 242, n. 43. 
77 "Dominion Unemployment Relief Since 1930", p. 23. 
78 James Struthers, "A Profession in Crisis: Charlotte Whitton and Canadian Social Work in the 
1930s", Canadian Historical Review, LXII, 2 (June 1981), pp. 169-85. 
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confidential since there were "a few statistics" of which she was not certain.79 
In next two years the Maritimes tightened their relief offerings still further in a 
campaign against the "demoralizing effect" of relief and "relief dependency". 
The federal government provided the incentive by trimming its direct relief 
payments to the provinces by 15 per cent in April 1936 and another 10 per cent in 
June. After Whitton's report, total direct relief grants to the provinces were cut 
by about one third in April and June 1937 and those to the Maritimes by 62.7 per 
cent.80 Once again the Maritime governments seem to have been masking 
adversity in public assertions of optimism. With the return of better economic 
conditions, they argued, relief was no longer so necessary. New Brunswick went 
further. In August of 1936 the government of Allison Dysart announced the 
absolute termination of direct relief in New Brunswick.81 
There was a certain logic in the government's action. To the degree that its 
finances would permit, the Dysart government, upon taking office late in 1935, 
had launched a series of positive programmes including pensions for the aged 
and the blind and new public works projects.82 In the poorer municipalities they 
agreed to pay up to 90 per cent of the cost of the relief of unemployables.83 The 
employables thus isolated were expected to find work in expanded highway 
programmes, a slowly improving forest industry, or by joining the pioneer 
settlements. The federal cutbacks forced the pace. Rather than undercutting the 
new programmes to pick up a much larger share of direct relief, the Dysart 
government apparently decided to reap whatever political and psychological 
advantage might be derived from posing as the first government in Canada to 
end "the dole". This decision was easier for New Brunswick than for other 
provinces since their people received so little in any case, especially during the 
79 [Charlotte Whitton], "The Organization of Aid to Persons in Distress: Report and Recommen-
dations of the Division on Co-ordination of Aid", March 1937, Department of Labour Papers, 
RG27, vol. 227, file 617, vol. 2, pp. 65b and 68-9, PAC. 
80 Monthly payments to the provinces are given in "Dominion Unemployment Relief Since 1930", 
pp. 25-7. More comprehensive annual figures which includes money for work projects and 
drought relief are available in "Dominion Relief Expenditures", J.L. Ralston Papers, PAC. Total 
federal relief payments to the Maritimes dropped from $2.8 million in 1935-36 to $2.5 million in 
1936-7 and to $1.4 million in 1938-9. Relief payments to the country as a whole for these years 
were $79.4 million, $78.0 million and $68.5 million. See also J.R. Rowell, "An Intellectual in 
Politics: Norman Rogers as an Intellectual and Minister of Labour, 1929-1939", M.A. thesis, 
Queens' University, 1978, pp. 143-4. 
81 Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 13 August 1936. For a collection of statements on relief policy by 
members of the New Brunswick cabinet from May to August 1936 taken from the Saint John 
Telegraph-Journal, see enclosures J.H. Conlon to Marjorie Bradford, 13 April 1937, Canadian 
Council on Social Development Papers, MG28,110, vol. 122, file "1937", PAC. 
82 Positive views from different perspectives on Dysart's administration are contained in R.M. 
Tweedie, On with the Dance: A New Brunswick Memoir, 1935-1950 (Fredericton, 1986), and 
Patrick Burden, "The New Brunswick Farmer-Labour Union 1937-1941", M.A. thesis, 
University of New Brunswick, 1983. 
83 See New Brunswick Cabinet Papers, 1 December 1936, PANB. 
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summer months. Government spokesmen in New Brunswick explained their 
action as necessary to defend the credit of both province and municipalities and 
to help those dependent on direct relief which was "sapping the morale and 
initiative of our people".84 As economic conditions again worsened in 1937, this 
'cold turkey' cure caused real suffering even among people who had a very 
limited acquaintance with "relief dependency". The province did relent suffi-
ciently to provide emergency assistance to the city of Saint John and the 
northern municipalities during the winters of 1937 and 1938.85 
With the benefit of hindsight one can criticize Maritime leaders on humanitar-
ian grounds for failing to do more to ameliorate the hard circumstances of their 
people in the 1930s. Throughout the period they seemed to accept, to grant and 
to rationalize less than the minimum required by their citizens for physical and 
economic health. So harsh were their policies in all three provinces, even when 
compared to those of other governments in the period, that they tempt one to 
attribute them to some distinct trait of regional character, perhaps arising from a 
different class configuration or a unique aspect of their political culture. But a 
close examination of the structure and operations of the relief process in Canada 
reveals logical reasons for the Maritimes' apparently deviant behaviour. Under 
the system of conditional matching grants the three provinces were forced to 
play in a relief game whose rules only allowed the effective participation of 
wealthier players. The additional pressures and more limited choices faced by 
Maritime leaders largely explain their more draconian treatment of those 
requiring assistance. 
The study of relief policies in the Maritimes suggests yet another perspective 
on the cumulative development of regional disparity in Canada. In the 1930s 
with business stagnant throughout the country, federal funds played an 
important role in the economic survival of individuals and industries. The 
Maritime region received during the decade approximately $50 millions less in 
relief monies from the federal government than they would have had the money 
simply been distributed on a per capita basis. In the extreme deflation of the mid 
1930s such a sum was not insignificant. One can speculate on the role which it 
might have played in saving individuals from personal bankruptcy, allowing 
independent commodity producers to maintain their operations within a market 
economy, or enabling at least some of the pioneer settlements to emerge as 
productive communities. One might speculate too on the impact of this sum if it 
had been available to the provincial governments for the health and education of 
the regional work force and/ or maintaining the region's relative level of 
infrastructure including roads and electricity.86 It is ironic that, while emerging 
84 Synoptic Report of the Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick, 1937, pp. 57 
and 131. 
85 New Brunswick, "Public Accounts", Journals of the Legislative Assembly, 1939, pp. 355-6 and 
A.P. Paterson's report to the Cabinet 20 May 1937, New Brunswick Cabinet Papers. 
86 Weaknesses in these areas would later be cited as factors in the consolidation of regional disparity 
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as the agent of the welfare state in Canada, the federal government, through the 
inequity of its matching grants formulas, inadvertently became an agent in the 
development of regional disparity. 
during the 1940s. E.R. Forbes, "Consolidating Disparity: The Maritimes and the Industrializa-
tion of Canada during the Second World War", Acadiensis, XV, 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 3-27. 
